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Note: A different version of this paper will be appearing in the New Mexico Law
Review, Volume 33, Issue 1. The version submitted here is my own re-edit of the final
version submitted to the law review prior to any law review editing. At the risk of
overkill but for the sake of openness, I would like to detail the various changes in the
hope that they will meet the requirements of the competition.
F i t , in general, this paper is my own work, not the work of the law review. There are
certain changes I made to the paper on the d
t
,
but except as detailed below, the
changes are my own work and do not reflect input fiom the law review staff.
Certain changes made to this version parallel changes I made to the law review
version (such as corrections to the usage of "comprise"). This group of changes
includes only those changes I made on my own, without prompting by law review
staff.

A few minor typos have been corrected (e.g., "stewfor "step"). In the law review
version, these may have been corrected based on my editor spotting them. In the
submitted version, they were corrected based on my either seeing them during the
re-edit or catching them during an automated spell check. These instances are nue
(perhaps three in the entire paper) and do not affect the substantive content of the
paper-

* There were two changes to the second sentence of footnote 186 that were made in
response to two words, "due process?", offered by Professor Browde after I had
submitted the paper for law review edit:
Initial version: "Current thinking seems to root privacy in equalprotection, Roe,
410 U.S. at 153, though that approach suffers from the limitations that the 14th
Amendment equaIprotection extends only to state actions..."
Revised version: "Current thinking seems to root privacy in 'the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept ofpersonal liberty and restrictions upon state action,' Roe,
410 U.S. at 153, though that approach suffers from the limitations that the 14th
Amendment extends only to state actions..."
Italics added to show changes. This is the only substantive change made in
response to any comments received after submitting the paper for law review edit.
I kept it because it makes the footnote more accurate and does not seem like a
major change to the paper. If, however, the circumstances of the change would
disqualify the paper for consideration, I would be glad to submit a version without
that change.

Aside h m what is noted above, this paper incorporates no input from the law
review. The law review files can substantiate this if there are any questions.
There are additional changes in the law review version that, I think, improved that
version. Those changes, though, were based on my editor's suggestions and are
not included in this version (e.g., "comment" instead of "paper").

I hope that this version is sufficiently independent of the law review's version to permit
its consideration. It is not actually the final version before law review input, but except as
noted above, it is a version independent of law review input. It was prepared with the
intention of staying within the guidelines for the competition, and I hope it successfully
does so.
I should add that, in spite of the above, the paper definitely owes a great deal to the
thoughtful, detailed, and valuable comments h m Professor Baum, my faculty advisor
for this paper. Regardless of this paper's eligibility for the competition, her input made a
world of difference.
The truth of the abwe sworn to on mv knowledge and by the honor code,

Of Hammers and Saws: The Toolbox of Federalism and Sources of Law for the Web
Thomas A . Lane

Con tents

I. Introduction ...............................................................................................................

2

II.The Nature of the Web ...................................................................................................

5

A. The Protocol Layer................................................................................................

6

B.The S o h a r e Layer ..................................................................................................

12

C .The Human Layer...............................................................................................

16

J.II. The Nature of International Law.............................................................................

19

IV.The Nature of Federalism ............................................................................................ 29
V . The Nature of Non-Governmental "Law" ................................................................. 38
VI. A Case in Point: The CPPA........................................................................................ 43

.

.

VII .Prehmmary Suggestions........................................................................................... 48
A .A Role for International Law .............................................................................. 48

B.A Role for Federal Law............................................................................................ 51
C . A Role for State Law ................................................................................................ 61
D. A Role for Non-Governmental Law .......................................................................

65

E.A Role for Hybrids ................................................................................................... 68
VIII.Summary .............................................................................................................:.... 69

I. Introduction
Federalism is a fact of U.S.law. It might be viewed as a "sacred cow,"' or more
generously as "a value that deserves independent c~nsideration,"~
or more simply as a
"first principle."3 But it is a fact, and it is within the framework of federalism that U.S.
law will be developed and applied to the Internet and World Wide
This paper argues that federalism is in fact particularly well suited to the
development of law for the web: It may be "one world, one Web," in the sense that the

E.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic

Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 Va. L.
Rev. 265,265 (1990).
Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Prover Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38 Ariz.

L. Rev 917,919 (1996).

'&United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,552 (1995).
For this paper, "Web" will be used in a generic sense to refer to the World Wide Web
itself, the underlying Internet, and the related functions such as electronic mail and
newsgroups. Where distinctions among the types of functions are needed, the paper will
use more precise terminology. In general, though, the Web is the interface through which
most users access and experience the various aspects of the Internet.
For this paper, "law" is viewed in a broad sense. It includes governmental law, such as
statutory and common law, as well as non-governmental sources of regulation, control, or
influence, such as the voluntary technical standards developed by the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C).

Web is a globally shared resource. Such a perspective suggests that it would be beneficial
to have areas of law that are consistent internationally. But it is also "a world of Webs,"
with multiple interconnecting but distinct networks, multiple interacting groups of users,
and multiple and diverse potential legal issues. This approach suggests that a diversity of
local law would be beneficial in certain areas as we1L6
The conflict between, on the one hand, a pressure for consistency in Web law and,
on the other, a role for diversity creates the first underlying theme of this paper. There is
no single answer for how to best apply law to the Web. The legal tool best suited for
deterring child pornography differs from the legal tool best suited for establishing a
standard of care for tort negligence on the part of Web site operators.
The second underlying theme is that the Web, though a fundamentally new way
of communicating among people, is nevertheless a human creation. Its newness suggests
that new law will, at times, be appropriate. Its human roots, in turn,suggest that much
existing law can be applied to the Web, with varying degrees of modification. Some new
legal tools may need to be created, but many old tools remain viab~e.~

Obviously, "local" in a Web sense is not the same as "local" in a geographic sense. State
boundaries are not always the best way to segregate issues related to the Web. In some
instances, though, state boundaries remain meaningful. For example, nothing about the
nature of the Web suggests that a business license for an Internet Service Provider (ISP)
should be any different from licenses for more traditional neighboring businesses.
7

Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cvberlaw Might Teach, 113 Haw.
-

L. Rev. 501,501-502 (1999) [hereinafter Lessig I] (discussing whether the "law of

U.S. federalism is flexible enough to accomodate law from.many sources:
international, federal, local, and non-governmental. Federalism can adapt existing law to
new situations while concurrently providing avenues for the creation of new law. The
Web creates a diversity of legal needs; federalism offers a diversity of legal tools.
This paper offers a general exploration of the federalist legal toolbox, as currently
and potentially applicable to the Web. The paper begins with overviews of the nature of
the Web, international law: the federalist system, and non-governmental sources of
regulation. Against this backdrop, the paper examines the recent U.S. Supreme Court
ruling on the constitutionality of the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA)~an act
that demonstrates both su~cesses'~
and failures" in applying federal law to the Web.
Finally, the paper offers suggestions regarding which source of law--international,

cyberspace" has value as a distinct discipline, or whether it might be better left to the
existing tools of law).

In the U.S. federalist scheme, international law is applied within the country through
internal U.S. mechanisms such as treaty ratifications. See infra text accompanying notes
64 & 65.

Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. A, Title I, $ 121, 110 Stat. 3009; ruled on in Ashcroft v. Free
S~eechCoalition, 535 U.S. 234,122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002).
lo

In criminalizing the distribution of actual child pornography via the Web. See infra text

accompanying note 155.
I1

In attempting to criminalize the distribution of virtual child pornography via the Web.

See infra test accompanying notes 151 & 152.
--

federal, state, or non-governmental--is best suited to addressing particular legal issues
regarding the Web.
11. The Nature of the Web
By now, certain observations about the Web are very nearly truisms. The Web is
global in scope, extending to all seven continents.I2 A population of users is quick to
proclaim the independence and ungovernability of the web.I3 Some users take advantage
of the perceived anonymity of the Web to escape behavioral constraints of the "real
wor~d."'~
Combined, these factors can lead to an impression of a "Wild Wild Web," an
electronic version of lawless Old Tombstone in the days of the O.K.Corral.
Such an impression is, however, flawed. As Lawrence Lessig has pointed out,
there are multiple mechanisms for applying law to the web.'' Once identified, individual

l2 See,

s,Yahoo! listing of Web sites by region, @

http://dir.yahoo.com/Regional/Regions/ (leading to links such as live Webcasts fxom

Antarctica).
I'

See. es., Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 4-5 (Basic Books

1999) [hereinafter Lessig II] (describing the perception that the Web "could &be
fkee").
14

See, e.g.. id. at 14-17 (discussing "Jake" who posted "graphic and repulsive" stories to
-

the alt.sex.stories newsgroup).
"Id. at 30-42 (discussing "architectures of control").

users can be brought before court.I6 Software can utilize authentication and authorization
to identify users and control access to content and permissible activities." The underlying
protocols themselves can be altered to control activity."
A. The Protocol Layer

At its core, the Web is not beyond regulation; at its core, it is simply a collection
of protocols.lg The basic Internet protocols are processing and formatting rules that

l6

See, ex., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (where Sidney

Blumenthal brought a defamation action against Man Drudge); United States v. Monis,
928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991) (where Moms was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 5 1030 for a
"worm" that caused damage to government computers).
I'

Authentication and authorization are related, but distinct, actions. Authentication

establishes the identity of a user; authorization controls what that user, once identified, is
permitted to do. Authentication is the key to a doorlock; authorization, the size of the
room behind the door. See, e.&, Cisco Systems, "authentication" and "authorization,"
Internetworkina Terms and Acronvms, available at
http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cdtd/doc/cisinitdal2.htm.
"See Lessig 11, =a

note 13, at 51-53 (describing the effects of regulating code,

including the limitations of the likely resistance).
Beneath the protocols, there are two additional layers. The first is the hardware, the
machinery and wiring of the various computers and connections that constitute the
physical foundation for the Web. The second layer is composed of the operating systems,
such as Windows or Unix, that enable the hardware to understand and process the

enable computers to communicate with each other across a series of interconnected but
independently operated computer networks.20The Web, in turn, is an overlay of protocols
that make it simple for users to navigate and use the underlying ~nternet.'' Added to the
mix are a variety of file format protocols that enable a receiving computer to
communicate to its user what the sending computer has sent, including

images,23

Internet protocols. Neither of these layers is unique to the Web, and the legal issues
regarding both are beyond the scope of this paper.
20 See RFC

791: Internet Protocol 9 2.1 Relation to Other ~r&ocols(Internet Engineering

Task Force (IETF) Request for Comment (RFC) 198I), available at
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc791.txt?numbe1=791.
21

See RFC 2616: Hypertext Transfer Protocol--HTTP/l. 1 5 1.I Purpose (IETF RFC
-

1999), available at http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616.txt.
22

See, m,HTML 4.01 S~ecification8 5.1 The Document Character Set (W3C

Recommendation 1999), available at http://www.w3.org/TR/html40l/charset.htm5.l.
23 See IA-6801:

Electronic Image Formats and Com~ressionAlgorithms 8 0.1 Image

Formats (Los Alamos National Laboratory Information Architecture Project (IA Project)
White Paper 1998), available at http://www.lanl.gov/cgi-bin~projects/ia~iastd.cgi?std=~ia6801#0.1-img.

A separate group of protocols addresses security-related concerns such as

and

encryption2' and a~thentication.'~
These protocols can be separated into global protocols, public protocols, and
private protocols, each of which warrants separate legal consideration. Global protocols

are those which every user's machine must support if that user is to utilize the Web at all.
The most obvious example is the Internet Protocol (1~);~' if a user's machine does not
support this basic protocol, then no communication across the Internet is possible.28

A global protocol demands global delinition, but it conversely invites little legal
intrusion. Because the protocol

be followed in order to use the network, there is

little that the law can add in terms of coercion or deterrence. Furthermore, in order to be

24

See, a,
MPEG-2 FAQ 5 1 What is MPEG? (Berkeley Multimedia Research Center),

at http://bmrc.berkeley.edu/frame/research/mpeg~mpes;!faq.html.
25

&,F P S PUB 46-2: Data Encmtion Standard (DES) (Federal Information

Processing Standards Publication, National Bureau of Standards 1988), available at

http:Nwww.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip46-2.htm.
26

&,RFC 1994: PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) (ETF

RFC 1996), available at http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1994.txt.
"RFC 791:
28

Internet Protocol, m a note 20.

This is a bit of an overstatement. Protocols other than P can be used to communicate

over limited portions of the infrastructure underlying the Web, if that infrastructure is
specially configured. Standard I? is needed, however, to communicate across the overall
global resource that is the Web.

global, these protocols

be made public, thereby ensuring independent review of

their effectiveness and trust~orthiness.~~
International technical organizations already
exist for the development and publication of global protocols?0 There is little that
government could add to what these groups are already doing, and the direct specification
of global protocols stands as a clear example of an area where government should not
interfere.
Public protocols are those which are openly published and which a user needs to
adopt in order to perform a particular action, but which the user need not adopt unless
helshe chooses to perform that action. For example, the Internet Relay Chat Protocol
(IRc))' is openly published and supported by a number of different products?2 A user
who chooses to participate in an IRC chat room must have IRC-supporting software
installed, but a user has no need for such software if helshe chooses not to participate in a

29

An ongoing theme in this paper is that protocols and software that are exposed to

public review are less likely to contain hidden viruses, bugs, or vulnerabilities, because a
large number of independent readers will have had the opportunity to review them for
just such flaws.
30

&,IETF, homepage at http://www.ietf.org; W3C, homepage http://www.w3c.org.
RFC 1459:Internet Relay Chat Protocol (IETF1993), available at

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1459.txt?number=l459.
32 See,

G, Tucows Chat - IRC product listings at http://www.tucows.com~circ95.html,

http://mac.tucows.corn~circmac.html,
and http:Nlinux.tucows.comlinternet/irc.html.

chat room or if helshe prefers a chat room based on a different protocol (such as AOL
Instant Messenger).

In general, a public protocol seems to invite almost no legal control. It is openly
published, so any hidden viruses should be easily exposed. It does not require global
conformity, since it is only used by a sub-group of users. It is not subject to
monopolization, since anyone who chooses to write a program to support it can do so.
Absent some sort of complicating issue, there seems little reason to interfere.33
A private protocol is a privately owned, unpublished protocol. In general, a user
who wishes to use the protocol must obtain software fiom the owner of the protocol. An
obvious example is the file format used for Microsoft Word; a user who wishes to create,

33

One such complicating issue has involved the national security concerns associated

with encryption software based on public protocols such as Secure Socket Layers (SSL).
See. e.& Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research
Council, Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society ch. 4 Export
Controls (National Academy Press 1996), available at
http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/crisis/chapter4.txt (discussing the use of export

controls for encryption software under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1949 and
the Export Administration Act (EAA)). The complete text of the report is available at
http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/crisis/.

view, or edit a document in this format must generally obtain software from Microsoft
itself.34
From the outset, a private protocol becomes a subject of law. The creation and
fixation of the protocol invokes copyright;)5 any misappropriation of the private protocol
would be subject to copyright remedies.36 Furthermore, because the private protocols are
secret, there is no opportunity for independent readers to verify whether there might be
hidden vulnerabilities or other flaws embedded within the protocol itself. The possibility

34

The alternatives are to obtain software from a manufacturer licensed by the protocol

owner, to obtain pirated copies of the software, or to obtain a legally "reverse engineered"
compatible product. For a discussion of software piracy, see Eric H. Holder, Jr., Remarks
at a Press Conference Announcing the Intellectual Property Rights Initiative (July 23,
1999), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/dagipini.htm; for a discussion of reverse
engineering and its legal protections under the "fair use" doctrine of U.S.copyright law,
see Seaa Enternrises Ltd. v. Accolade. Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (1993).

''Copyright law also protects global and public protocols, but because they have been
made f?eely available, there is no cause of action if they are in fact used. There may,
however, be a cause of action if a global or public protocol is modified into a private
protocol and then used for profit.

''Subject to the "fair use" exception for reverse engineering.

note 34.

of such vulnerabilities or flaws, in turn, creates the potential for actions under both
contract3' and tort."

B. The Software Layer
On top of the protocols themselves, there are the various software programs used
to implement the protocols. One major division among software programs is between
open-source software, whose underlying human-readable source code is made readily
available to the

and private, proprietary software, whose source code is guarded

as a trade secret. There is a fuaher distinction among the proprietary software between
"shareware," which is freely distributed but which users are expected to voluntarily pay

''The product did not perform as advertised. See U.C.C.

5 2-3 14 (1989) (defining an

implied warranty of merchantability).
38

The product caused harm. See Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 6 cmt. a (1965) (a

general explanation of types of tortious conduct).
39 See, G,

Free Software Foundation, & h~p://www.gnu.org/fsUfsf.html.

for, and what is sometimes called "~hrinkware,"~~
which frequently comes in shrinkwrapped packages and which users must pay for before the software can be insta~led.~'
As with the underlying protocols, the software that is the most open and public
invites the least legal intrusion. The more accessible the source code, the better the
opporhmity for independent readers to ensure that it lacks hidden viruses and will in fact

40

"Shrinkware" is a descriptive term used by the software development community. It

was used, for example, by Stuart Anderson in response to the fust question &om the
audience at a meeting of the Florida Linux User Xchange.

htrp://www.flux.org/linux/lsb.html.It is also used by Lou Grinzo in the final paragraph of
"Lowering the Net for Open Source." Dr. Dobb's Journal, September 20,1999,available
at http://www.ddj.comldocumentsls=891/ddj99750/9975o.htm.
41

Some software is a hybrid. The Linux operating system, for example, is open-source

software, but companies such as Red Hat offer shrinkware versions of Linux. Red Hat
takes the open-source Linux, certifies it, compiles it into machine-readable form, puts it
onto convenient CDs, shrinkwraps the package, and provides customers with technical
support. Users who purchase shrinkware Red Hat Linux are paying for the convenience
that results from Red Hat's services, not the Linux itself. Linux remains open source,
while Red Hat Linux remains shrinkware. See Red Hat Linux Operating System,
http:Nwww.redhat.com/software/linux/.

perform as adverti~ed.~'
The better the opportunities for correcting potential problems
before they become problems, the lower the need for legal interference.
Conversely, the software that is least open to public review--private software,
whether shareware or shrinkware--has a high potential need for legal control. When the
source code of software is not open to independent review, the users lose their
independent source of protection against hidden viruses, bugs, or other "undocumented
features."43This loss of before-the-fact informal protection increases the potential need

42

In theory, the openness of source code also makes it easier for malicious hackers to

discover security holes within the software. In practice, however, if malicious hackers
can find the security holes, so can benevolent security professionals who are quick to
communicate the flaw to others so that it can be corrected before it is exploited. For
example, as Linux gained popularity, a series of security holes were rapidly exposed and
communicated, along with fixes as they became available. See. a,
the following
advisories dealing with Linux *om the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) at
Carnegie Mellon University: CA-1999-03 FTP Buffer Overflows, at

http:llwww.cert.orgladvisories/CA-1999-03.html;CA-1998-12 Remotely Exploitable
Buffer Overflow Vulnerability in mountd, at http:llwww.cert.orgladvisorieslCA-199812.html; CA-1998-05 Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND, at
http:Nwww.cert.orgladvisories/CA-1998-05.html.
43

"Undocumented feature" is an informal euphemism for software performing in

unexpected ways, regardless of the degree of inconvenience andlor damage the
unexpected behavior causes.

for after-the-fact legal protection, which in turn invites the potential application of
contract law,44tort law:'

and perhaps personal property law.46

Furthermore, a tort negligence action against a provider of private software might
be appropriate if software is sold that lacks adequate security. The first step here would
be a fact pattern where a hacker exploited a security flaw in the software to gain access
and cause damage to a user's computer. The next step would be to establish that the user
had a reasonable expectation that such harm would not occur. The third step would be to
established that the software provider had a duty to provide reasonably secure software,
that the provider failed to meet its reasonable standard of care in incorporating security
into the software, and that the lack of reasonable care was a proximate cause of the
damage to the user's computer. From this pattern might flow a tort negligence action,
which in turn might encourage providers of private software to improve their attention to
security."7

44 Cf. a=

Cf.
-

note 37 (contract for private protocols).
note 38 (tort for private protocols).

46 Perhaps through

conversion, for example, if a hidden virus has caused the user's

machine to be used in ways that the user did not want. See infra note 206.
In addition, private software creates a heightened interest for the software
provider in the application of intellectual property law.
47

Consider the following scenario: A major software provider offers an upgrade to a

popular email program. Users adopt the upgrade. A student in Southeast Asia sends out
an email message containing an attachment that exploits a vulnerability in the email

C. The Human Layer

On top of the layers of protocols and software, there are the people who use the
Web. Such people may be individuals or members of groups or employees of
corporations which have a distinct legal "personhood."48They may be users who seek the
content and services available on the Web, providers of such content and services,
operators who run the sites that the Web comprises, or any combination of tlie above.

program and its integrated scripting program. Millions of computers become infected,
networks across the world become overloaded and shut down, and untold economic
damages are caused. In brief, that is what happened with the "I Love You" virus.
CNN, "Love Bug" Takes on the World, May 5,2000,

htrp:llwww.cnn.com/2000/WORLDleurope/05/.
The student who wrote the "I Love You" virus was prosecuted in the Philippines,
but a question that was not addressed was whether the manufacturer of the software,
Microsoft in this case, might be held liable under tort negligence for offering an email
product which permitted such widespread harm to be done. The manufacturer would
likely put forward a defense based on warranty limitations, but that defense can fail if the
limitations are found to be unconscionable. Restatement (2d) Contracts (i 208; Uniform
Commercial Code (i 2-302.
48

See, gg, Louisville, C. & C. R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844); Marshall
-

v. Baltimore & 0.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853). Under these cases, a
corporation is a "person" in a Constitutional sense even though it is not a "citizen"; the
corporation can sue and be sued, but it cannot vote.

They may access the Web through a typical browser, or they may employ software such
as "spiders"49to automatically search the Web and gather content on their behalf.
Whatever the case, the common denominator is that these are people, humans, with all
the associated behaviors.
Such behaviors range from the perfectly legal and arguably praiseworth? to the

In the middle ground, Web users seem to display all of the characteristics of
~riminal.'~
human behavior, subject on the one hand to the physical constraints of Web technology,
but on the other hand sometimes emboldened by the Web's shortage of behavioral

49

Software that automatically searches across Web sites.
Such as the Wildlife Conservation Society's efforts to promote conservation through its

Web site,

http://www.wcs.or~,or the United Nations' and U.S. Congress' efforts to

promote the accessibility of law, at http://www.un.org/ and http://thomas.loc.gov,
respectively.
The creation and distribution of child pornography, for example, is an internationally
recognized crime. See, u,CNN, Dozens Arrested in Child Porn Probe, Mar. 18,2002,
at http://www.cm.com~2002/US/O3/18/fbi.child.porn/index.html;
CNN, Web Child Porn
Ring Broken, Aug. 9,2002,

h~p:llwww.cm.com/2002NS/O8/O9/internet.cld.pom.busdex.h(both describing
prosecutions arising fiom the creation and online distribution of child pornography).

constraint^.'^ Users get happy; users get angry; users get disappointed; users reveal
difficult truths;" and users lie, cheat, and cause harm.
Law, in its various manifestations, only exists in response to human behavior.
Because human behavior is exhibited on the Web, law for the Web, whether new or
adapted, becomes necessary. Legal actions so far have included the tort of defamation,"
copyright infringement:'

and crimes such as unauthorized access and harm to computer

systems.56There is no reason to expect that actions will stop there; rather, there is ample
reason to believe that torts for the Web will eventually expand to test such areas as
negligence," negligent infliction of emotional distress," and loss of con~ortium?~
There
are likely to be actions testing new areas of contract6' and property?'

-

" See m

a note 14.

"See Robyn

Wagner, Comment, Don't Shoot the Messenger: Limiting the Liabilitv of

Anonvmous Remailer Operations, 32 New Mexico Law Review 99,114 (2002)
(discussing how anonymous remailers facilitate discussions among victims of child abuse
or AIDS).

"&,Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
"u,
Playboy Enterprises v. Webbworld, 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
6
'

&,United States v. Monis, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991).

" For example, if an ISP

fails to adequately protect a user's personal private infomation

from outside hackers, there may be a malpractice-type action. See infra note 124.
For the purposes of the bystander rule, it is unclear who is a "bystander" in the context
of the Web or what the Web equivalent of "contact" is.

The diversity of the Web itself, and the diversity of its users' behaviors, suggests
that a diversity of law is needed to address the issues that arise. A diversity of law, in
turn, suggests a diversity of legal mechanisms. This need for diversity supports the
proposition that the U.S. system of federalism is particularly well suited to the
development of law for the Web.
111. The Nature of International Law
In the modem world, international law provides the broad framework within
which national law operates. The U.S.may be the world's lone remaining superpower,
and it may be slower than other countries in adopting specific international agreements
such as the Kyoto ~ r o t o c oor
l ~the
~ Rome Statute of the International Criminal

59

It is unclear what "consortium" might be within the Web and whether its loss can be

considered a legal harm.
60 It

is unclear how to apply the Hadlev v. Baxendale rule of foreseeability/implied

consent to transactions conducted on the Web.
There may be a conversion aspect to a hacker wrongfully using another user's account.
See i n h note 206. Also, it is unclear whether a "cyber-squatter" can use a trademarked
-Web address for long enough and actively enough to establish adverse possession.
62

Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,

December 10, 1997, FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.l, 37 I.L.M. 32.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (I.C.C.), July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9,37 I.L.M. 1002, available at
http:Nwww.un.orglIawlicc/statute/romefia.htm.

Still, the U.S. is a member of the international community, and international law provides
the framework for U.S. law.
International law is incorporated into U.S. federalism through various
mechanisms, primarily operating at the federal level. For example, both treatiesa and
implementing legislation can be used to incorporate international agreements into federal
law:'

thereby bringing such agreements within the scope of the supremacy clause.66

Furthermore, both state and federal courts can hear cases based on international law.67
International law therefore plays a role in the U.S. federalist scheme.

a &,U.N. Charter, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945) (treaty ratified by Senate).

&,North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. 103-102
(1993) (Congressional act to implement trade agreement).
66

U.S. Const. art. VI.

67

&,28 U.S.C.5 1605 (2002) (which codifies a U.S principle that even foreign

countries can be subject to federal or state courts in certain circumstances); Christopher v.
Harbury, 122 S. Ct. 2179,2185-2190 (2002) (where federal court considered
international law in tort action against CIA); Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82,98-99 @.C. Cir. 2002) (federal court stating, "We would break
with the noms of international law and the structure of domestic law were we to extend a
constitutional rule meant to protect individual liberty so as to fiustrate the United States
govenunent's clear statutory command that Libya be subject to the jurisdiction of the
federal courts in the circumstances of this case"); Register of Wills v. Arrowsmith, 778
A.2d 364,378-381 (Ct. App. 2001) (where state court considered international law

Because the Web is an international resource, there is an immediate appeal to the
idea of using international law to govern it. In theory, this would provide for global
consistency, enabling, for example, a Calcutta businessman to perform transactions
across the Web with a consistent set of expectations regarding the validity and
enforceability of the contracts behind such transactions. Such an ideal would conceivably

cany many benefits.

In fact, however, international law has limitations. It is primarily a law among
nations, not a law among individuals. It is rooted in the Treaty of ~estphalia,~'
which in
turn is based on concepts of national sovereignty. Each country becomes a legal entity
under international law, akin to the way that corporations became legal "persons" unda
U.S. law during the nineteenth century.69

arguments regarding estate taxes); Busby v. Alaska, 40 P.3d 807,813-816 (Ct. App.
Alaska 2002) (where state court considered international law arguments regarding
driver's license revocations).
Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and their
Respective Allies, October 24, 1648, available at

http:lIwww.yale.edullawweb/avalon/westphal.htm.
69

&,Louisville, C. & C. R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844); Marshall v.

Baltimore & O.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853). These decisions were rooted in the
fact that a corporation needed to be a "person" in a constitutional sense in order to sue, be
sued, or, as a consequence, obtain constitutional protections. Similarly, a nation must be a

International law has been extended to the activities of individuals, but only in
certain cases. If an individual's actions can be attributed to a state, then that state can be
held liable for those actions.70 If an individual has violatedius coeens7' norms of
international law, then that individual can be held accountable under international law,
but such jus coaens norms have, so far, extended only to widely recognized as wrongful
acts such as piracy,7z genocidey3 war crimes such as torture or taking of hostagesy4 and
crimes against humanity such as murder or en~lavement.~~
Nothing on the Web has

legal entity in order for it to enter into treaties or otherwise operate within the h e w o r k
of international law.
O
'

Res~onsibilitvof States for Internationally Wrongful Actions (RSIWA), Int'l L.

Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.602fRev.l (2001); Diplomatic and Consular Staff (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
" "A mandatory norm

of general international law h m which no two or more nations

may exempt themselves or release one another." Black's Law Dictionary 864 (7th ed.
1999).
"Third United Nations Convention on the

Law of the Sea, Part VII, arts. 100-107, Dec.

10, 1982, U.N. Doc. NConf.62/121,21 I.L.M. 1245 (1982), available at

http://www.un.orglDepts/los/convention~ageements/textd~clos/closin~.h~.
73 Rome Statute of
74

Id art. 8.

-9

75

Id., art. 7.

the International Criminal Court,

note 63, Part 2, art. 6.

approached such levels of harm, though it seems plausible that some actions eventually
might.76
The agencies of international law have a similar bias in favor of state actions and
against individual actions. The founding statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
requires that nations be parties to actions brought before i t n An individual who seeks to
bring an action in this framework must first convince hidher govemment to bring an
action on hidher behalf. Govemment intervention on behalf of individual citizens is far
h m automatic." Other international courts. such as the International Criminal Tribunal

76

The problem for the 2002 Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition,

for example, included a hypothetical where a hacker fiom one country used the Internet
to hack into and disable another country's rail scheduling system, leading to the collision
of two trains and the deaths of hundreds of crew and passengers. Available at

http://www.ilsa.orgljessup/jessup02/problem.hl.As reliance on the Web continues to
grow, so does the possibility that a Web-based attack can lead to significant physical
harm, thereby moving closer to the realm of crimes against humanity.
77

Statute of the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.), art. 34, para. 1, June 26,1945, 3

Bevans 1153,59 Stat. 1055,1059.
78

Note the difficulties that the Berenson family has had in seeking U.S. government

assistance in the case of Lori Berenson, held in Peru.See, e.g., CNN, Court in Pem
U~holdsBerenson Sentence, Feb. 18,2002,
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/americas/O2/18/berenson.peru/index.html.

for the Former ~ u ~ o s l a v i ado
, ' ~bring actions against individuals, but their creation
requires action by the United Nations, which in turn requires agreement among multiple
countries.80 Such mechanisms seem designed to deal with specialized, relatively shortterm problems, and they do not seem likely to offer an individual plaintiff anything
resembling "speedy relietn8'

79 Homepage

- G,

80 See,

http://www.un.org/icty/index.html.

Statute of the International Tribunal, S. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc.

S/RES/827 (1993) (amended by S. Res. 1166 and 1329), available at

http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut~stat2OOOOcon.htm.
81 During the

writing of this paper, the founding statute for the International Criminal

Court (I.C.C.) went into effect.

note 63. It seems yet too early to offer a balanced

assessment of the I.C.C. The goals are laudable and there is reason to hope that the court
can succeed at offering a permanent neutral forum for crimes such as war crimes. There
are, however, two significant limitations. First, the court's jurisdiction is limited to major
crimes, which would exclude civil actions and all but the most egregious Web crimes.
And second, the U.S. is not a signatory to the I.C.C. treaty. Absent U.S. cooperation, any
sort of tribunal will face serious difficulties in applying any sort of law to the Web. See
U.N., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Overview,

http://www.un.org/law/icc/generdove~iew.h;
Communication kom U.S.
Government to U.N. Secretary General, May 6,2002 ("This is to inform you, in
connection with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on July 17,
1998, that the United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty"), available at

Individual actions under intemational law can, however, be brought in municipal
c0urts.8~Historically, municipal courts have been prominently used to prosecute piracy,
which has long been recognized as an international crime and which has a long tradition
of being prosecuted in whatever municipal court happens to establish personal
jurisdiction over the

defendant^?^ The difficulties in municipal courts are threefold: first,

the international law must be established, second, the court must establish personal
jurisdiction over the defendant; and third, the wurt must be able to enforce meaningful
relief for the plaintiff, should judgment be found in plaintiffs favor.
The first of these prongs, defining the law, might on its face seem the easiest to
establish, but even it invites problems. International law is not like the common law, in
that international law relies on the behavior of and agreements among nations rather than
prior judges' interpretations of specific s i t ~ a t i o n sThere
. ~ is not stare decisis as the

http://untreaty.un.orglENGLISWbible/englishintmetbible/p~~chapter~H~~eatylO.a
sp#N5.

** In international law, "municipal courts" include all courts within a country, including,
within the U.S. system, city, county, state, and federal courts.
See, e.pl, Restatement (3d) of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. 3 522 cmt. c

("Any state may seize a ship or aircraft on the high seas on reasonable suspicion of
piracy, arrest the suspected pirates, seize the property on board, try the suspected pirates,
and impose penalties on them if convicted.").
84

See, -,

Statufe of the I.C.J., =note

77, art. 38 (which excludes previous decisions

of the I.C.J. from the available sources of law).

common law knows it. This leads to an unwieldiness and lethargy in developing new law.
For example, the International Law Commission (ILC)has been working on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wronghl ~ c t i o n s 'for
~ more than 50 years.
Although the current draft is a praiseworthy expression of what international law on the
subject should be, it remains a draft, not yet adopted by the General Assembly, and not
yet carrying anything more than persuasive force under international law.86The Web will
not wait 50 years for its law to be developed."
Of the three prongs, if defining the law is in fact difficult, the next two,
establishing personal jurisdiction and enforcing a judgment, can approach impossibility.
Personal jurisdiction would depend upon the cooperation of the defendant or hidher
home country,8' and enforceability would depend on a variety of factors. Enforcement of

85 RSTWA,

m a note 70.

86

Statute of the I.C.J.,

87

In exceptional circumstances, the United Nations can at times develop general

note 77, art 38.

principles of international law quite rapidly, as evidenced by its various resolutions
against terrorism. &,Human Rights and Terrorism, G.A. Res. 160, U.N. GAOR, 56th
Sess., U.N. Doc. AIRES/56/160 (2002). Such rapid-fire resolutions suffer, however, from
generality, vagueness, and, in the case of terrorism, a certain circularity of definitions,
which would make it difficult to enforce the resolutions in any but the most blatant
circumstances.
88

"Home country" is a simplification. Depending on circumstances, it might mean the

country where the defendant is domiciled, resident, or physically present. The basic idea

criminal incarceration would require either physical custody over the defendant or the
cooperation of the defendant's home country; enforcement of monetary criminal penalties
or civil damages awards would require the cooperation of either the defendant or the
country where hisher money or property is located; and enforcement of equitable
remedies would require the cooperation of the defendant's home country.
For example, in a U.S. municipal court, personal jurisdiction over an alien
defendants9would dep&d on whether the defendant had "substantial contacts" with the
forum court's ~ t a t eIf. ~an Arizona customer purchases a defective product f?om a French
finn's Web site, and if the customer then brings action in an Arizona court, the issue of
personal jurisdiction would turn upon whether the French firm's volume of business with
Arizona was substantial enough to establish personal jurisdiction. Enforcement by a
municipal court would depend upon some combination of personal custody of the

is that the "home country" is the country which can, at a particular time, establish
physical jurisdiction over the defendant.
89

"Alien" in the U.S. system meaning a citizen of either another state or another nation.

90

"Substantial contacts" is, of course, a shorthand way of expressing the far more

complex series of tests that have evolved b m International Shoe Co. v. Washinbon, 326
U.S. 310 (1945), and its progeny.

defendant, cooperation of the defendant:'

or cooperation of the defendant's home country

or the country where the defendant's money or property is located.92
The difficulties do not, however, mean that international law cannot be useful for
the Web. Certain areas of law for the Web can be based on already established
international law. One clear example here is copyright law, where the Berne
convention9' has already provided a multinational framework for interpretation of
copyright issues. Cases involving parties from different countries have already
established that copyright can be extended to the

Such cases have already proven

that international law has a role in the application of law to the Web.

91 Such cooperation on the part

of the defendant might be motivated, for example, by a

defendant's desire to continue doing business within the U.S.
92

Such cooperation among countries is not automatic. See, e . Yahoo!,
~
Inc., v. La Ligue

Contre le Racisme at L'Antisemitemisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (where
a U.S. federal court refused to enforce an order from a French court).
93 Beme

Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971,25

U.S.T. 1341.
94

& Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (where, among other

things, the German plaintiff brought action against the U.S. co-defendant Education
Broadcasting Systems for posting an allegedly protected image to the Web); Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, Inc., v. Comline Bus. Data, No. 98 Civ. 641 DLC, 1998 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 6806 (S.D.N.Y. April 14, 1998) (where a Japanese plaintiff brought action against

The initial foothold in areas such as copyright might be extended into other areas,
such as areas of ~ontract.~'Such law might be developed through bilateral agreements,
multilateral agreements, or U.N. resolutions. In spite of the difficulties inherent in
developing and applying international law, there can be areas where international law is a
useful tool for addressing legal issues regarding the Web.

IV. The Nature of Federalism
As a starting point, U.S. federalism is a fluid, dynamic, and somewhat ambiguous
concept.% A "federal" system is a system that gives power to the various states, while a
"federal" statute takes power away from the states and exercises power by the central
government. To avoid such ambiguities within this paper, the words "federalist" or
"federalism" will refer to the system and theory of federalism, while the word "federal"
will refer to the central
Justice Brandeis famously suggested that sometimes the fact of the law is more
important than the correctness of the law, especially when various parties have come to

a U.S. company for, among other things, electronically transmitting to Japan translations
of protected works).
95

This paper later suggests that it might be useful to develop a general U.N. resolution

for a "bill of rights" for Internet consumers. Infra Part VILA.
%

See, %,William Safire, On Language: Federalism, The Political Word that Means its

Ouposite, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30,2000, at Magazine Section 20.
97 This

approach leads to some awkwardness. "Federalist system" sounds less graceful

than "federal system." Hopefully, clarity can overcome the awkwardness.

rely on a particular interpretation?' During the same term of the Court, the same Justice
also famously suggested that a strength of federalism is that it creates room for
experimentation among the states?' The second principle's room for experimentation
creates instability and unpredictability, directly counter to the first principle's emphasis
on stability and predictability. Although contradictory, both principles hold value for the
Web.

On the one hand, a business that is considering whether to open a Web site and, if
so, how its site will operate would benefit h m having hard, established law to factor into
its consideration. An individual who likes to "experiment" on the Web would benefit by
knowing in advance which "experiments" are legally acceptable and which are not.
Potential victims of abuse might be better protected by stable law. All of the above argue
in favor of hard, established law.

On the other hand, many aspects of the Web do not yet seem ready for hard law.
Although the dissemination of child pornography across the Web is widely

98

Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,406 (1932) (Brandeis, dissenting)

("[fin most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that

it be settled right.").
99 New

State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, dissenting) ("It is

one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.").

condemned,'" attempts to control access to pornography by minors on the Web have run
afoul of fundamental First Amendment protections.'0' Similarly, within the environment
of an online chat room, it may not be simple to determine when "flaming"'02 is parody,
defamation, or a harmless venting of emotion.Io3These examples suggest that there are

note 51, and infra Part VI.

loo

See

lo'

-See in& Part VI.From one perspective, this example might be viewed as a conflict

between two sources of hard law, federal legislation and the federal Constitution. For the
purposes of this paper, though, the example is better viewed as an illustration of a need
for experimentation to determine which sort of hard legislative law, when applied to the
Web, will align with the fundamental U.S. values expressed in the Constitution.
'02

Messages that abuse another user.

lo'

Hustler said Jerry Falwell had sex with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell objected,

but because the statement was found to be parody, Hustler's right to say it was protected.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). Matt Drudge said Sidney Blumenthal
beat his wife, but because the statement was not parody, Drudge was not protected.
1998). On a continuum between parody
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C.

and assertions of fact, it is not clear where a flame in a chat room would fall. Most likely,
the flame would not pretend to be thoroughly researched or authoritative, which would
push it toward the protections of parody. But it would probably present itself as if it were
an assertion of fact, which would push it away h m those protections. Because the issue
is unclear, multiple attempts at resolving it on a fact-specific basis might uncover general
principles which could then be applied to later cases.

areas where it may be beneficial to avoid hard law and take advantage of the flexibility of
experimentation.
U.S. federalism is rooted in the fact that, after the Declaration of Independence
but before the U.S. Constitution, each of the states considered itself a sovereign nation.'04

- -

'04

Articles of Confederation, March 1, 1781. Note the distinction between

confederation and federation.
There is the view that the U.S. version of sovereignty was intended to turn the
English concept of sovereignty on its head. Rather than the English model, where
sovereignty was historically rooted in the divine infallibility of the monarch, the U.S.
model in this view is rooted on the sovereign power of the people, portions of which the
people choose to assign to the state or federal governments. See. ez., Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S 44, 150-155 (1996) (Souter, dissenting); U.S. Tenn Limits,
Inc., v. Thornton, 514 U.S.779,838-839 (1995) (Kennedy, concuning).
The distinction between this "sovereignty in the people" approach and the more
traditional "sovereignty in the states" approach has led to vigorous discussions regarding
the 1lth Amendment limits of federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe. The
distinction also holds the possibility of interesting discussions about how the
Constitution, in more general terms, should be applied to the Web. If sovereignty is
rooted in the people, then the Constitution becomes an instmment whose primary purpose
is to protect the interests of the people, which in turn suggests an expansive view of
Constitutional protections offered to Web users. If, however, sovereignty is rooted in the
states, then the Constitution becomes an instrument whose primary purpose is to protect

Each state had plenary power, which it could divide and assign as it chose. The original
states agreed to assign certain limited powers to the central government, while retaining
other powers to themselves. Of the retained powers, some, in turn, were assigned to the
counties and municipalities within each state.'''
Early attempts at expanding the power of the central government were mixed in
their resu~ts."~
The Civil War amendments''' brought a fundamental shift toward federal

state interests &om intrusions by the federal government, which in turn suggests a more
restricted view of Constitutional protections for Web users.
How this distinction might affect the development of Constitutional law for the
Web has the potential of being significant, but it is beyond the scope of this paper. For
the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient that traditional U.S. jurisprudence is based on
the "sovereignty in the states" approach, that states held plenary power prior to the
Constitution and assigned a portion of that power to the central U.S. government.
'ol

Examples are the power for counties to establish sheriffs departments and the power

for municipalities to establish real estate zoning regulations.
Io6

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), asserted federal court jurisdiction

over the individual states, which quickly led to the Eleventh Amendment, denying that
power. McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), in turn,asserted a
federal authority over central banks, free of state taxation, an authority that survived.
Osbom v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). Worcester v.
Georsia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), asserted that only the federal government held
authority over Indian tribes, which led to President Jackson's apocryphal statement along

power, at the cost of state power. After initial Supreme Court rulings that seemed to limit
the scope of the Civil War amendments,'08 a series of rulings, combined with
Congressional activity, expanded the power of the federal government during the New
Deal, World War 11, and the Civil Rights period.'0g The Court has since appeared to be
limiting central authority in some areas, while expanding it in

other^."^

the lines of "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it" (reported with
variations in various sources). See. es., Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian
Law 83 (1982); Grace Steele Woodward, The Cherokees 171 (Univ. of Okla Press
1963); Horace Greeley, American Conflict 106 (1864).
lo'

Especially the Fourteenth Amendment with its explicit

of power to Congress

over the states in Section 5.

I&,Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36 (1872); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
log

I&,Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Korematsuv. United States, 323 U.S.

214 (1944); Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
'I0

Compare Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (declining to

exercise federal jurisdiction over the traditionally state area of real property law) with
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (exercising federal jurisdiction over the traditionally
state area of evaluating election returns); also compare Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer
Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495 (1988) (Scalia, for the majority, declining
to extend federal preemption to decontrol petroleum prices, based on an absence of "a
clear and manifest purpose" of Congress) with Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487

For this section of paper, the issue is not what the specific boundaries between
state and federal power might be at any given moment in time. Rather, the point is that
the boundaries are fluid, varying according to subject matter, the country's needs during a
particular time period, and the inclinations of the Justices who sit on the Supreme Court.
Instead of a clear gospel, there are competing principles--states1rights vs. federal
supremacy, the value of experimentation'" vs. the need for ~niformity."~
Across all of this is the distinction between statutory law and common law. There
is little, if any, question that state courts can create common law as they see fit, in the
absence of contrary statutory provi~ions."~And although there may be "no general
federal common law,""4 there are numerous areas where federal courts can develop
common law if they c h o ~ s e . " ~

U.S. 500 (1988) (same term, Scalia, for the majority, extending federal preemption to
wver military contracts, even without a Congressional act on point).
Ill

S e e m note 99.
See,
-

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (relying on a need for national

uniformity in immigration law).

"'Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938).
'I4

Id.

'I5

See,

=,Textile Worken Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,450-451 (1957);

Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401,405-406 (1981).

The basic federalist system boils down to a fluid mixture of federal, state, and
municipal"6 law, each of which comprises a mixture of statutory and common law.
Federal law is supreme1" where the Constitution has given power to the central
government'18or where the Supreme Court has found either an implied grant of power"9
or an oveniding need for national uniformity.'20 Where federal law has not pre-empted
other law, or where the federal government has explicitly granted aspects of its power to
the states or municipalities,'*' the state or municipality creates the law.
Within this framework, some aspects of Web law fall easily into the federal law
category. For example, the Web's underlying telecommunications infrastructure is

'I6

"Municipal" in a domestic sense meaning town, city, and county.

'I7

U.S. Const. art. VI.

'IS

As in the regulation of interstate commerce. U.S. Const. art. I, 5 8, cl. 3.

'I9

&,dormant commerce clause. Id. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S.

761,769 (1945) ("For a hundred years it has been accepted constitutional doctrine that
the commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation, thus affords some
protection from state legislation inimical to national commerce . . .."); Railroad Co. v.
Husen, 95 U.S.465,469 (1877) ("Whatever may be the power of a State over commerce
that is completely internal, it can no more prohibit or regulate that which is inter-state
than it can that which is with foreign nations.").

anote 112.

I2O

&, immigration.

121

&, insurance regulations. 15 U.S.C. 5 1012.

already regulated through federal law.I2' Some aspects fall clearly.within the realm of
state or municipal law.'" Other aspects are less clear.
For example, if there is to be malpractice for Web site operators,'24 the
corresponding standard of care might be determined by either regional standards or
central standards. Regional standards could follow the established model for medical
malpractice and would logically fall under state law. Under the regional approach,
though, a user accessing a Web site, when deciding how much to trust the Web site,
would be unlikely to know the standard of care that applied to it, thereby making it
difficult to make an informed decision about how much personal private information to
share.
Central standards of care, on the other hand, could easily fit within federal law.
They would offer predictability to the user and uniformity across the nation. However,
they might also stifle legal innovation'25and overburden Web site operators in "less
developed" regions.

122

&,TelecommunicationsAct of 1996, Pub. L. No.

104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in

scattered parts of 47 U.S.C.).
Such as business licenses for an ISP or the zoning regulations that regulate the
physical structure within which an ISP is housed.

&, for inadequately protecting personal private information that a user has shared.
See Thomas A. Lane, Comment, Cvber-Malvractice: Toward Tort Negligence for the
(unpublished, on file with New Mexico Law Review).
See
-

note 99.

The key point about U.S. federalism derives from its historical instability and the
imprecision of the boundaries between state and federal power. The instability and
imprecision yield flexibility. As Web law is far from mature, such flexibility may be
particularly valuable.'26
V. The Nature of Non-Governmental "Law"

Official bodies within the states, federal government, and international
organizations create "law" that is binding in that government will use its power to enforce
the law and coerce compliance. In a broader sense, however, "law" encompasses more

than rules, regulations, and principles that the government will enforce; it also
encompasses other norms, agreements, and standards that shape an individual's behavior

Before concluding this brief overview of the nature of U.S. federalism, it is important
to note that certain powers have also been assigned to state and federal administrative
agencies. In the area of labor-management relations, for example, the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB)has been empowered to issue decisions that carry the full force
of law. 29 U.S.C.9 156. In a practical sense, administrative law has a substantial impact
on areas as diverse as commercial aviation, the power industry, securities, and the
environment. In a structural sense, however, all of the administrative agencies derive
their power from the legislatures that originally held that power. The agencies are limited
in their reach to the limits of the power of the legislatures that created them. Hence,
although the agencies provide an additional option for potential sources of Web law, their
existence does not alter the hndamental federalist structure.

and promote a functional society.I2' In this broader sense, non-governmental law emerges
h m a variety of sources, including traditions, practices, and other more or less formal
agreements among groups of people.
Non-governmental law is sometimes incorporated into formal governmental law,
such as when a court adopts "contemporary community standards" as part of its legal
(and binding) definition of obscenity.'28At other times, particularly in the criminal
context, the prohibition against ex ~ o sfacto
t
laws prevents retroactive governmental
application of non-governmental law.'29 With or without the power of government behind
it, non-governmental law can exert substantial influence and warrants attention in any
consideration of Web law."'

12'

Law in this sense resembles the modalities of regulation discussed by Lessig. Lessig

II, =a

note 13, at 86-90.

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973).
12'

There is widespread disapproval of the desecration of human remains, but when the

operator of a Georgia crematorium was alleged to have severely mishandled cadavers
entrusted to his care, Georgia had no statute directly on point. Hence, the only crimes that
he was charged with involve thee by deception. See, CNN, Crematow Operator Faces

100New Counts, February 27,2002,
h~p://www.cnn.com/2002~AWlO2l26/crematory.cosedindex.hbnf.
"O

See, s,Lessig 11, m a note 13, at 37 (discussing differing U.S. and European

norms regarding smoking).

Sources of non-governmental law can be extremely informal. " ~ e t i ~ u e t t e , "for
'~~
example, grew out of informal consensus among early users of email and n e ~ s ~ r o u ~ s . " ~
Similarly, multi-user online communities began by informally developing their internal
norms of behavior; violations of those norms, in turn, have at times led to the
development of more formal procedures.133
Other sources of non-governmental law are more formal, more structured, more
like quasi-governments. Part 1I.A of this paper, for example, discussed the IETF and
W3C. These are both structured, independent organizations with central management,
dues-paying memberships, and formal procedures for the development and adoption of
standards.
The core work of the IETF and W3C involves the development of standard
protocols; in that sense, they develop the "law" of protocols. Beyond this core work, the
bodies also address issues of how things should be done, such as the IETF Netiquette

FAQ"~or the W3C Web Content Accessibility ~uidelines,'~'
which provide Web site
creators with guidance for how to make their sites accessible to users with disabilities.

The polite way of using email and newsgroups.

"I

'I2 See Netiquette Guidelines (IETF RFC

1855,Oct. 1995) available at

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfcl855.txt?numbe~l855.

See Lessig 11, s u ~ r anote 13, at 74-78 (describing how a multi-user community

13'

developed mechanisms of government in response to several "cyber-rapes").
a135

note 132.

Available at http://www.w3.orgM'RiWAI-WEBCONTENTI.

Given their technical expertise and the fact that they have already addressed certain
behavioral issues, bodies like the IETF and W3C may prove useful for developing
additional, more "legal-like" standards, which might then be incorporated into more
formal law, as appropriate, through reference by statute or adoption through common
law.
The American Law Institute (ALI) is another potential source of law. It resembles
the IETF and W3C in that it is an independent, non-governmental organization, but it
differs in that its primary focus is directly on areas of law, rather than areas of the Internet
or Web. ALI Restatements are, in part, useful compilations of existing law, but they also
develop and suggest new directions for law to move. The ALI might therefore also have a
role in the development of Web law, particularly in subject matter that requires vigorous
examination of existing law. While the W3C and IETF may be well suited for developing
guidelines for technical issues and general user behavior, the ALI might be a better
source for guidelines regarding legal issues such as the application of bailment theory to
the
As Lessig points out, there is, in addition to the above non-governmental sources,
the code of the Web itself--the protocols and programs that enable the Web to operate.I3'
If written one way, the code can permit certain behaviors; if written differently, the code

'36

An additional option would be for legal organizations such as the ALI to collaborate

with technical organizations such as the W3C and IETF.
137 Lessig

11,

note 13, at 20-21.

can constrain those behavi~rs."~Such "west coast code""9 affects online behavior more
directly than traditional law, in that the code proactively enables or disables capabilities
rather than creating after-the-fact consequences.'40
At the same time, however, the development, implementation, and use of the code
is itself subject to legal re~traints.'~'The code is both a source of regulation of user
behavior and an object that law controls. Hence, even while exerting its own influence,
the code itself is subject to the various governmental and non-governmental sources of
law discussed in this paper.

"*

For example, untraceable anonymity p m i t s users to speak without fear of

identification, which in turn can encourage whistle-blowers or people who wish to
discuss particularly sensitive personal issues, such as AIDS or sexual abuse. See suvra
note 52. Code written differently, though, could eliminate the possibility of untraceable
anonymity, which in turn would discourage those same discussions.
Lessigts phrase to distinguish it from "east coast code," the statutory code written in
Washington, D.C.
Even an injunction is only enforced through consequences that occur after the fact of a
violation of the injunction.
14'

See, 3.
suvra
. note 33 (discussing the export controls applied to encryption

software);
to software).

text accompanying note 35 (discussing the applicability of copyright law

VI. A Case in Point: The CPPA

The main thesis of this paper is that the U.S. federalist system is well suited to the
application of law to the Web because the system offers a diversity of legal tools to
address a diversity of Web needs. Implicit in this thesis is the concept that some tools are
better for certain jobs than others are. The recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling on the
constitutionality of the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA)'" demonstrates that
federal statutory law, while it has its place, is not always the most appropriate source of
law to use for the Web.
When an issue is "hot," legislators at the various levels of government will seek to
address it by statute. In the 1980s, Texas had a state statute forbidding flag

In

1989, the U.S. Supreme Court found that statute to violate the First ~mendment.'" Flag
burning became a hot issue, and before the year was finished, the U.S. Congress
responded with the Flag Protection Act of 1989.14' The following year, the Supreme
Court rejected that act as we11.l~~
Although Congress continues to introduce proposals to

14'

Pub. L. NO. 104-208, Div. A, Title I, 5 121, 110 Stat. 3009; ruled on in AshcrofI v.

Free S ~ e e c hCoalition, 535 U.S. 234,122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002).
143 Tex.

Penal Code Ann. 3 4209 (1989) ("A person commits an offense if he

intentionally or knowingly desecrates . . . a state or national flag.").

'" Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
145 Pub.

'41

L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989).

United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).

ban flag burning, the issue no longer galvanizes public opinion to the same degree, and
no proposal has passed both houses since 1 9 8 9 . ' ~ ~
As interest in flag burning has waned, interest in protecting children from the
perceived dangers of the Web has waxed. In 1996, Congress passed the Communications
Decency Act (cDA),'~* which sought to restrict access by minors to "indecent" materials
on the Web; in 1997, the Supreme Court struck down much of the CDA on First
Amendment grounds.149Also in 1996, Congress passed the Child Pornography
Prevention Act (cPPA),'~ which, among other things, sought to criminalize the creation,
distribution, and possession of "virtual child pornography";15' in 2002, again on First
Amendment grounds, the Cowt struck down provisions of the CPPA that did not involve
actual child actors."'

In 1999, Congress adopted the Child Online Protection Act

'" See Michael J. Davidson, The Flae. the First Amendment. and the Militarv, 2001
Army Law 1, 1-2 (2001) (giving an overview of Congressional activity regarding flag
burning).
'41

Pub. L. No. 104-104, Title V, 110 Stat. 133.

149 Reno v.

I5O
151

ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).

Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. A, Title I, 5 121, 110 Stat. 3009.
In general terms, virtual child pornography involves simulated images of children. For

example, computer-generated manipulations can be used to take an image of a youthfullooking adult engaged in sex and place a child's face on the adult's body.
Is*

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002).

(coPA),'~' which sought to overcome the constitutional defects on the CDA; although
the COPA has not yet been tested before the Supreme Court, its constitutionality is

In each case, legislators were responding to a "hot" topic; in both of the cases
decided so far, the legislators were found to have overstepped their authority.
This is not meant to suggest that Congress does not have a role in addressing
Web-related issues. Among the parts of the above-mentioned acts that have survived
constitutional scrutiny are the key CPPA provisions that deal with pornography that
involves actual child actors."' But in those areas where Congress' actions were struck
down by the Court, the actions were not only unconstitutional but also arguably unwise'56
or, from the perspective of this paper, simply an application of the wrong tool.
The CPPA ban on virtual child pornography is a case in point. Three Justices-O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Scalia--would have read the statute narrowly, restricting the
interpretation of the language to "images that are virtually indistinguishable from actual

I"

Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. C, Title XIV, 112 Stat. 2681.
Lessig II, -note

13, at 177. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S.564, 122 S. Ct. 1700

(2002), addressed the standards to apply to determine the constitutionality of the COPA,
it did not address the underlying constitutionality itself.
15'

a,
18 U.S.C. 5 225 1(c), which covers the transmission of actual child pornography

by computer. The Court thereby kept the underlying rationale, based on actual
exploitation of children, of New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,756-757 (1982).
Is6

Lessig II,

note 13, at 174-175.

children.""' A fourth Justice--Thomas--while concumng in the judgment, raised the
possibility that the technology of computer-generated images might evolve to the point
that "it becomes impossible to . . .prove that certain pornographic images are of real
children,"'58 in which case the issue would warrant revisiting for law-enforcement
reasons. The majority itself recognized that "sexual abuse of a child is a most serious
crime and an act repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent
This creates the backdrop of a Supreme Court that unanimously condemns the
sexual abuse of a child. No Justice took issue with the prohibition against the distribution
of actual child pornography. The only dissentions regarded the boundaries of what
constitutes pornography.160
The first prong for upholding the prohibition of the distribution actual child
pornography came h m m r , that actual child pornography "created a permanent
record of a child's abuse, [and] . . .each new publication.

. .would cause new injury to

the child's reputation and emotional well-being."'61 This prong, in turn, can be separated
into two components: the original harm to the child and the ongoing harm to the child's

Is'

Free Soeech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1409 (O'Connor, concuning in part and

dissenting in part).
lS8

Id. at 1406 (Thomas, concurring in judgment).
Id. at 1399 (majority opinion).
Or, in the case of Thomas, what level of proof law enforcement must meet in order to

demonstrate child abuse.
16'

Free Soeech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1401.

reputation and emotions. Even if the child himiherself does not suffer the original abuse,
a "virtual image" of sufficient technical quality could cause the ongoing harm.'62
For three Justices, a "virtually indistinguishable" image would already be outside
the reach of First Amendment protections.'63For a fourth, a virtual image of higher
technical quality than is currently possible might fall outside the First Amendment
protections.'64For the remaining Justices, one component of their rationale for not
protecting actual child pornography--the ongoing harm--provides a strong argument for
not protecting virtual child pornography. As technology advances, the ongoing harm
component of their rationale becomes stronger.
For the current state of technology and with the broad wording of the CPPA,
Sveech Coalition was correctly decided. It does not, however, seem to be a particularly
stable decision. Instead, it seems more like a holding action, a means of buying time until
the issues regarding virtual child pornography can be more clearly resolved.
The defamation-like aspects of the ongoing harm to a child do not yet seem ripe
for federal legislation, particularly since defamation is not traditionally an area of federal
law. This seems to be an area where, if Congress would restrain itself kom acting, the
various states could experiment, and the various courts could evaluate detailed fact
patterns, be informed by each other's decisions, and eventually grow toward something

'62 Note,

however, that for virtual child pornography, based as it is on a lie, there may be

state actions available for defamation andlor infliction of emotional distress.
a"-'
'@-note

note 157.
158.

resembling consensus. When that something resembling consensus is reached, Congress
could centralize the law on the basis of experience, as opposed to simply responding to
political pressure.
There are ways of developing law that exploit the strengths of the various
governments and courts, and there are short cuts that lead to constitutional violations. The
federal statutory ban on virtual child pornography in the CPPA was a short cut. Certain
tools are better for certain jobs than other tools are: a hammer can break a board, but a
saw leaves a smoother cut.

VII. Preliminary Suggestions
Even though this paper is limited in scope, it would seem incomplete without an
attempt to offer some practical suggestions. The tools have been examined, their general
uses described. One Supreme Court ruling has been evaluated to shed light on one tool,
federal statutory law, succeeding in one application but failing in another. What is left is
to suggest a few ways that the variety of tools might be usefully applied to the diversity
of issues raised by the Web.
A. A Role for International Law

Given the general unwieldiness of international law, it seems a poor tool for
addressing cutting-edge issues. It can, however, be a good choice for addressing largescale issues of multinational import, particularly if new law can be based on existing
international law.

As previously mentioned, international copyright law has already evolved to the
point where it can, in many cases, be easily adapted to the context of the

Similar

straightforward adaptations may also be available for other types of intellectual property
law, including patent and trademark, at least to the extent that they have already been
clarified under agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).'~~
Copright, patent, and trademark meet all three of the basic criteria: they are
large-scale issues, they have multinational import, and they are areas where international
law that can be adapted has already been developed.
Contract law can, in some instances, meet the first two criteria: it is a large-scale
issue with multinational import. Contract law itself, however, does not seem to have been
extensively developed at the international level. There are some contract-like issues
addressed in agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),'~'
but the more promising approach seems to be for parties to a contract, particularly
sophisticated parties to a large contract, to continue to insert clauses that specify which
municipal law will apply and which municipal court will have jurisdiction.
Beyond that, particularly for smaller transactions such as small purchases of
books or music CDs, there are limits to what international law can offer. It might be
possible to develop a general UN resolution for a "bill of rights" for Internet consumers.
Details, though, would fall back on municipal law. To the extent that municipal law

a-

text accompanying notes 87-88.

'66

December 15, 1993,33 I.L.M.I.
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Canada-Mexico-U.S.A.. December 8,1992,32 I.L.M. 605.

cannot practicably be enforced, law regarding small international transactions likely
needs to fall back on the old principle of caveat emptor.

In the area of criminal law, two subjects fresh in the memory where international
law might help are the use of the Internet to facilitate terrorism or the distribution of child
pornography. Both have general UN resolutions to support them at the level of
international law.Ib8Both, however, are rooted in physical events that occur in a
geographical place-the actual terrorist act or the actual abuse of the child. Both, in turn,
although frequently involving cooperation among law enforcement agencies in multiple
countries, fall back onto municipal law for actual prosecutions.'69
This suggests a variation on the theme of international law that might have
general applicability to Web law. First, a basic agreement is reached at the international
level, which is true of the Berne Convention, GATT, terrorism, and child pornography,
and which would be true of a general Internet consumers' bill of rights. Second, each
participating country adopts internal laws to implement the basic agreement. Third, the
basic agreement gives the various law enforcement agencies the ability to collaborate

Ib8

&,Human Rights and Terrorism, G.A. Res. 160, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc.

A/RES/56/160 (2002); &tional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and of the Sale of Children. Child
Prostitution. and Child Pornomwhy, G.A. Res. 263, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc
A/RES/54/263 (2000).
169 See.

e.g., supra note 50.

across national boundaries. And finally, the actual litigation occurs under the local law of
the country where the court with jurisdiction sits.
All of the areas suggested above involve large-scale issues with multinational
import, and all except contract involve established international law that can be adapted
to the Web. All can further be implemented through the pattem of general international
agreements, local implementing legislation, multinational cooperation among law
enforcement agencies, and final litigation under local law. They stand, then, as examples
of the types of areas where the application of intemational law can benefit the Web.

B. A Role for Federal Law
Although state and federal law were treated concurrently in the discussion of the
nature of federa~ism,'~'they will now be treated separately. Concurrent treatment is
helpful when discussing the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of federalism.
When discussing practical application, however, separate treatment of federal and state
law becomes more helpful.
As a starting point, all federal authority is limited by the U.S.Constitution, as
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. Regardless of how beneficial federal law might
be for a particular subject, unless it falls within the fluctuating outer boundaries set by
interpretation of the Constitution, it is not valid and cannot be used.
A second constraint is that the Constitution grants a potential for power, but until
that power is exercised by Congress, both the courts and the executive branch are

I7Oa-

Part w.

generally prohibited from exercising it.I7' For the purposes of this paper, this constraint
primarily affects the exercise of federal common law by the courts. By its very nature, the
Web involves interstate and international communications, all including a commercial
component.'72 Web regulation is easily brought within the broad parameters of the
interstate commerce clause.173Hence, the scope of regulation that Congress could
theoretically impose on the Web is extremely large.'74
The federal courts, however, cannot exercise federal common law over the entire
Web; they are limited to the regions of law, or closely related regions, that Congress has
addressed. For example, federal common law can address the interstices in the federal
civil causes of action related to hacking into protected computers,17' but federal common
law cannot extend such civil causes of action beyond those specifically provided for by
statute.

171

One exception to this general statement involves the areas that are unambiguously and

exclusively assigned to the federal government, such as the power to make treaties. U.S.
Const. art. 2,5 2.
17'

Even a "fiee" Web site is built upon a series of commercial transactions, many of

which are interstate in character, ranging from the construction of the various computers
to the provision of the communications links.
17'

U.S. Const. art. I, 5 8.

174 At
17'

least within national boundaries.

18 U.S.C.3 1030(g) provides for a federal civil cause of action under the section &

if one of six specific factors is met.

Within these constraints, there are numerous areas where federal law might be
useful for the Web. First, federal law is necessary in areas where Congress has already
preempted state power. Second, federal law is useful in areas wherenational conformity

in law is ~ a 1 u e d .Third,
l ~ ~ federal law is necessary in those areas over which the
Constitution has given exclusive power to the federal government. And finally, federal
law will tend to be more reasonable if a national consensus has already emerged about
what reasonable law would be, not infrequently through permitting the states to perform
their process of experimentation for long enough for a consensus to ripen.
Examples of areas where Congress has already exercised power include the
regulation of the telecommunications inhtructure underlying the

and the

criminalization of hacking into federally protected computers178or using the Web to
distribute actual child pornography.179A less obvious example involves employment
practices. No one had the Web in mind when originally developing federal law regulating
employment practices.180But the Web can be used to establish employment contracts,
various types of work can be performed across the Web, and any type of work product
that can be fixed in electronic media can be transmitted across the Web. Hence, if an

176 By analogy to

immigration law and treaty implementations. See s w m notes 112 and

64.
17'

anote 122.

17*

Infra note 207.

179 k
'*O

a n o t e 155.

&,Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 88 Pub. L. 352,78 Stat. 253.

employment relationship would otherwise be covered by federal law in a non-electronic
environment, and if the only variation on that relationship is that it is Web based, then the
same federal law will still apply to the Web. Congress historically exercising power in a
non-electronic environment thereby creates an exercise of power over a region of the
emerging electronic environment. Along with the exercise of power comes the pre-Web
federal common law that was developed to fill the interstices in statutory law."'
Beyond the areas where federal law has in fact already preempted state law, there

are areas where new federal law can be useful to promote the goal of national
consistency. Sometimes national consistency is compelled by practical considerati~ns.'~~
At other times, though not compelled, national consistency becomes desirable as a
reflection of an emerging national consensus.'83

18'

This follows the pattern established in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353

U.S. 448 (1957).
Is2

&,Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (national consistency

for military contracts); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (national consistency in
immigration law).
Is3

In this context, the Civil Rights Act of 1964,88 Pub. L. 352,78 Stat. 253, can be

viewed as the larger part of the nation imposing its emerging consensus regarding race
relations upon a dissenting region of the nation. Similarly, the CPPA prohibition against
using the Web to distribute actual child pornography is an instance of federal law
reflecting national consensus. The suppresion of child pornography is not necessary for
the government to function effectively, but consensus condemns child pornography. The

A promising area of federal work, based upon an emerging national consensus,

involves federal protection of privacy on the Web. Privacy is often referred to as a
"right," but there is no express right of privacy in the Constitution. The various Supreme
Court decisions that have found something resembling a right to privacy have been less
than thorough in their explanation of its source and parameters.'84 Still, there is a broad
expectation of privacy among U.S. citizens and a general perception that it is a right."'

dispute regarding virtual child pornography, conversely, reflects a lack of consensus
about what the reach of the prohibition should be.
The popular formulation of privacy being part of a "penumbra" of constitutional
rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,483 (1965), has since been abandoned by
the Court. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,152-153 (1973) (A "penumbra" of statutory
protections, however, seems to remain. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., v. Reis, 451 U.S.
401,406 (1981).) Current thinking seems to root privacy in "the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action," Roe, 410 U.S. at 153,
though that approach suffers from the limitations that the 14th Amendment extends only
to state actions, that 5th Amendment due process-based equal protection against federal
actions is implied rather than express, and that neither the 14th nor the 5th Amendment
provides protection against private actions. This author personally believes that the root
of the right can be found among the unenumerated rights of the 9th Amendment and the
rights reserved to the people in the 10th Amendment. Whatever its roots, and whatever its
validity as an actual Constitutional right, privacy is an expectation of the U.S. populace
that has become so valued that it resembles a Constitutional right. It is "right-like."

Given the consensus that privacy should be protected and the fact that the federal
government has the authority to regulate the Web, the protection of privacy is an area
where federal law is a good tool to apply to the Web. The federal governmenthas
responded with several initiatives, leading, for example, to a series of informative

reports.'86 Congress, in its turn,has enacted limited protections in legislation such as the
These acts do not
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)'~' and the COPA.'~~

Regardless of the independent status of privacy as a right, however, Congress, under the
interstate commerce clause, has ample power to protect it against any actors,
governmental or private, who might intrude into it.

Cf.. Winston S. Churchill, A History of the English Speaking People: The Birth
of Britain 60 @odd, Mead & Co. 1958) (Of King Arthur: "It is all true, or it ought to be;
and more and better besides.").

&,Privacv Online: A R e ~ o rto
t Conmess, Federal Trade Commission (June 1998),
available at http:Nwww.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/toc.h; Staff Report: Public Workshop
on Consumer Privacy on the Global Information Mixstructure, Federal Trade
Commission, (Dec. 1996) available at http:llwww.ftc.gov/report~lprivacylprivacyl.htm;
Privacy and the NII: Safeguarding Telecommunications-Related Personal Information,

U.S.Dept. of Commerce (Oct. 1995), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/privwhitepaper.html.
187

Pub. L. 99-508, Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 1848 (protecting against unauthorized access

to electronic communications).

yet reach issues such as Web sites that collect semi-sensitive personal i n f ~ r m a t i o nand
'~~
then pass that information on to marketing firms, but the federal action to date is a
promising move toward a more thorough protection of privacy. Such protection would
serve the goal of national consistency and reflect a general consensus.lgO
Another areas where federal law might be useful is contracts. Although contracts,

m,generally fall under state law, interstate contracts fall within the potential power of
the interstate commerce clause. Law for Web-based contracts would benefit from
national uniformity, in that both consumers and providers would have more consistent
expectations. Furthermore, the Uniform Commercial Code has been widely enough
adopted by the various states that a large area of consensus has emerged.I9l
In the area of Web contracts, federal law should not attempt to be overly
comprehensive. Too much detail would lead to competing and potentially conflicting
bodies of law--one federal for Web contracts, the other state for non-Web contracts--

''' Pub. L. 105-277, Div. C, Title XIV,Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681-736,47 U.S.C. $
231 (protecting, among other things, the privacy of information collected to determine
whether a user is an adult).
Such as email addresses and phone numbers.
At least among users of the Web, if not among those who seek to profit by the sale of
others' personal information.
19'

For example, the Uniform Commercial Code Locator at Cornell University links to

statutes !?om 49 states and the District of Columbia that correspond to UCC Article 1. At
http:Nwww.law.comell.edu/uniform/ucc.html.

which could in turn lead to all of the difficulties created by Swift v. ~ v s o n .This
' ~ ~ factor
counsels restraint and a certain generality about federal contract law.
Nor should federal law interfere with the ability of sophisticated parties on a
relatively equal footing to choose the law that should govern large-scale contracts.
Choice of law is one of the issues that such parties negotiate, and as their agreed upon
choice is factored into the value and expectations of the contract, so should their choice
be respected. This consideration counsels a federal focus on small-scale transactions
where one of the parties may be less sophisticated than the other.
The result of these considerations parallels the suggestion for potential
international law: a bill of rights for Web consumers. If an international bill of rights
could be established quickly enough, the federal law could be used to implement it
consistently throughout the states. Otherwise, a consistent federal law might provide both
an interim continuity among the states and a basis for future international negotiations.

Either way, a general federal law would provide the benefit of national uniformity
without interfering with the states' ability to experiment with the details.Ig3

19'

41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.64, (1938).

193 If

general federal statutory contract law for the Web were established, the ability of

the states to continue to experiment with the details would rely on the wording and
construction of a saving clause within that legislation. In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987), for example, the Supreme Court found that the saving
clause in ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 8 1144(b)(2)(A), was insufficient to preserve a state action
for improper processing of disability claims. The power of the courts to extend federal

Federal law might also be helpful in addressing tort negligence on the web.'%
Admittedly, torts are traditionally an area left to the states, and the bulk of the body of
tort law that currently exists was developed by the states. Furthermore, no cogsensus
about the issue seems to have emerged. Indeed, except for a few academic articles, the
question of whether tort negligence can even be applied in a Web context has barely been

Nevertheless, the potential benefits of addressing negligence at the federal level
are compelling. Users would have a consistent set of expectations, and providers would
know what was expected of them. When an unintentional harm occurred, the victim, the
tortfeasor, and the courts would all be spared the complexities of choosing among

preemption even in the face of a saving clause suggests that any such clause in a federal
statute for Web contracts must be explicit and unequivocal in its preservation of state
powers.
Negligence could address either the failure to adequately protect sensitive information,
-note

117, or the failure to adequately protect a computer from hacking, thereby

enabling others to use it as a base for attacks against other computers. &e,

Stephen

E. Henderson & Matthew & Yarbrough, Suing the Insecure?: A Dutv of Care in
Cvberspace, 32 New Mexico Law Review 11 (2002); David L. Gripman, The Doors Are
Locked but the Thieves and Vandals Are Still Getting in: A Proposal in Tort to Alleviate
Corporate America's Cvber-Crime F'roblem, 16 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 167
(1997).
I 9 ' a

note 194.

competing bodies of law. A single law would apply, at least within national boundaries.
Consistent expectations would then promote better informed behaviors on the part of both
users and providers.
Such law could be constructed in a manner that would permit flexibility in the
face of technological evolution. A general statute could federalize the issue of tort
negligence for ISPs. The definition of a reasonable standard of care could be left to
subject matter experts (SMEs) such as the W3C. The proper application of the
combination of federal statute and SME standards could be left to federal common law.'%
The above examples illustrate areas where federal law has already addressed Web
issues with success and areas where federal law holds promise for the Web issues. There
remain, however, the constraints. Federal statutory law cannot exceed the broad limits set
by the Constitution, and federal common law cannot exceed the narrower limits of the
scope of power that Congress has chosen to exercise.Ig7Within these constraints, it is
generally preferable to restrict federal law to areas where a national consensus has
emerged,19' though at times the value of national consistency overrides the desirability of
consensus. 199

19'

This specific approach to federalizing tort negligence for ISPs by combining law from

various sources is discussed in more detail in Part VILE of this paper.
197

The Constitution defines the limits of the field; Congressional action determines how

much of that field the federal government has occupied.
19'

See, u..
supra note 183 and accompanying text.
See. ex., suura text following note 195.

C. A Role for State L a w
Given the plenary nature of state power, state law should be applied to all areas
that require formal, governmental law and that have not yet been addressed by
international or federal law. The inclusionary aspect of this formulation--all areas that
require formal, governmental law-encompasses areas of law that have traditionally been
within state power, unsettled areas that could benefit !?om experimentation, and whatever
other areas that might fall into the gaps within existing law?''

The exclusionary aspect of

this formulation has already been addressed in the two preceding sections of this paper.
This paper has already suggested that state law is the appropriate tool for
addressing virtual child pornography. Any state treatment of this issue will be subject to
the same First Amendment constraints as were applied in Ashcroft v. Free S ~ e e c h
~oalition.~''The constitutional flaw that the majority found in that case was that the
particular wording in the CPPA regarding virtual child pornography was overbroad. The
key to overcoming that deficiency is to develop wording that is sufficiently narrow to
meet the First Amendment requirements. An ideal way to develop that wording would be

200 The

inclusionary aspect itself contains an exclusionary element--the need for

governmental law to be required. Any formal law will only cause disruption if it is
extended into areas where it is not needed, such as, for example, the detailed specification
of technical protocols.
535 U.S. 234,122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002).

through experimentation--multiple states enacting multiple statutes with multiple
variations of wording, each of which can in tum be tested by various courts."'
State law should also address any issues related to hackingzo3into individual
users' computers that federal law has not specifically preempted. Logically, an
individual's computer is a form of personal property. When that computer is linked to the
Web, its resources become a "site" within the Web, leading to a cyber-variant of real
property.204These analogies lead to unauthorized access to a computer being a form of
trespass205and unauthorized use of a computer being a form of conversion.206Both

'02

In addition to statutory criminal law, the states can explore the civil tort of defamation

as a potential path for developing the formulation of law thatwould be held
constitutional.
'03

"Hacking" here is used in a broad sense to include both active attacks, where the

hacker is interactively seeking unauthorized access to a computer, and passive attacks,
where the hacker sends out a virus or worm that automatically gains access and replicates
itself.
'04

Geocities, following this analogy, previously referred to those who create Web pages

on its computers as "homesteaders."
'05

An alternate path to reach the same conclusion is to view unauthorized access as

trespass to chattels. See. e.G, AOL v. National Health Care Discount, Inc., 121 F. Supp.
2d 1255,1277 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (finding that, under Virginia common law, trespass to
chattels can be applied to unauthorized access to computer systems).
'06

See, m,3.(blending conversion into the trespass to chattels analysis).

trespass and conversion are traditional areas of state law, and because of the relative
newness of applying them to the Web, trespass and conversion are good candidates for
state experimentation.
The federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA);~' as revised, is extremely
expansive in scope in terms of the computers it covers. With language extending its
protections to any computer "used in interstate or foreign commerce or
communication,"208the CFAA can be read to cover any computer that connects to the
Web. The types of unauthorized access and use that it criminalizes are, however,
specifically defined, and the CFAA contains no preemption clause. Absent express
preemption, state law remains intact insofar as it does not directly contradict the federal
law.209States are therefore free to complement the CFAA protections through state
statutory and common

2W

18 U.S.C.

5 1030.

208

18 U.S.C.

5 1030(e)(2)(B).

209

See, ex., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,208 (1985) (where the

threshhold question was whether Congress intended preemption). The requirement that
state law not contradict the federal law is due to the supremacy clause. States can
supplement federal prohibitions, but they cannot constitutionally legalize a federally
proscribed activity.
210 See,

a,
National Health Care Discount, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1271-1276, 1276-1277,

1277-1279 (allowing AOL's claims to proceed to trial concurrently under the CFAA,
Virginia statute, and Virginia common law, respectively).

Although this paper argues that tort negligence by ISPs should be a federal
issue:"

many other civil causes of action remain better left to the states. Trespass and

conversion have already been addressed; other examples include defamation, infliction of
emotional distress, and loss of consortium. All are traditionally areas of state law; none,
in the context of the Web, have a compelling need for national consi~tenc$'~or a clear

In addition, as this paper has already argued,2I4state law seems the
national consen~us.~"
best choice for resolving the details of contract law in the Web context.

'I'

Part V1I.B.
One exception to the lack of a need for national consistency is that all state law

remains subject to the constraints of the Constitution. Defamation law, for example,
regardless of whether it is used in a Web context, remains constrained by the First
Amendment. See, a,
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
'I3

In addition, several of the torts that this paper argues should be left to the states--

trespass, conversion, and defamation, in particular--involve intentional tortfeasors. The
operation of law has numerous inherent biases in favor of one party or another, such as
presumptions in choice of forum or choice of law. In general, the greater the tortfeasor's
intent, the more those biases should be shifted in favor of the victim. An unintentionally
negligent ISP is more entitled to biases such as consistent national standards of care,
since potential exposure to varying standards of care will tend to suppress the ISP's
willingness to participate in the Web. An intentional hacker, however, is less entitled to
biases in hislher favor, since knowingly causing harm is less deserving of protection than
unknowingly permitting harm to occur. The victim of an intentional tortfeasor should

Even with the broad formulation that state law should be applied too all areas that
require formal, governmental law and that have not yet been addressed by federal or
international law, there is still the restriction that formal law be required. The examples
given above are all areas where formal law steps in when more or less informal selfregulation fails. There remain, however, areas where the Web should be left
unconstrained by any governmental law.

D. A Role for Non-Governmental Law
Non-governmental "law" can cover all areas that do not require a governmental
power to enforce. This includes, in fact, the vast majority of technical issues and user
behavior. While deliberate defamation is a subject where formal law is, at times,
appropriate,215inadvertent ~ ~ a m x n i nisg better
'~
left to inforinal mechanisms such as user
education.

In addition to the constitutional and structural constraints on formal law discussed
in previous sections of this paper, there are certain practical constraints. For one, lawsuits
are expensive. Even if formal law creates a right, it would not be affordable for an
individual to bring a formal suit to enforce that right unless the harm were significant

therefore be more entitled to whatever advantages can be found in choice of forum,
choice among various states' law, and other sources of bias.
2'4a*

Part VI1.B.

=,-note

2'5

See,

2'6

Such as when an email user accidentally responds to all rather than simply responding

to the sender.

103, text following note 210.

eno~gh.~"
For small harms where suits are impracticable, non-governmental mechanisms
are the appropriate tool for protecting individuals'

interest^.^"

A second practical constraint on governmental law is that the various officials
who make such law are not generally experts in the technical side of the Web. Legislators
and judges are not the right groups to be debating the relative merits of assigning
different meanings to the second four bits in an Internet Protocol version 6 packet.219
Such technical issues are best left to the organizations of SMEs that specialize in
developing the technical specifications, such as the IETF and W ~ C . ~ ~ '

217 Similarly, a

class action based on small harms would not ljracticably be brought unless

a sufficient number of individuals suffered similar harms.
'I8

For example, if a member of a newsgroup misuses that group by posting inappropriate

messages, the manager of the newsgroup can protect the group's interests by removing
the individual's permission to post messages to the group.
'I9

See RFC 1883: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification, 3. Ihr6 Header

Format (IETF RFC 1995), available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1883.txt.
220

The government does sponsor groups such as the National Institute of Science and

Technology (NIST) that develop technical specifications that are applicable to the Web.
See, a,Advanced Encryption Standard Home Page
-

http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/.
Specifications from these groups are governmental, in
the sense that government sponsors the groups. The specifications are not, however,
formal law, in that adherence by non-federal groups is voluntary.

An additional practical constraint on governmental law is that it tends to evolve
slowly. Statutory law can take years to d e v e ~ o ~ . Common
~''
law does not develop until a
suit is brought and decided, and the common law does not become final for stare decisis
purposes until the suit has been appealed to, accepted by, and decided by the highest
court for the subject matter.222
As a result of this slowness of governmental law, issues whose solutions need to
evolve quickly should be left to non-governmental sources. One example already
discussed in this paper is the specific issue of a reasonable standard of care for ISPs in
protecting sensitive i n f o ~ m a t i o n Another
.~~
example lies in encouraging organizations
such as the ALI to collaborate with SMEs in adapting existing documents such as
Restatements to the

For example, at first blush, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204 (2002),
might appear to be a rapid governmental response to the Enron and Worldcom scandals
of spring 2002. In fact, its development can be traced back at least as far as 1996. See
United States General Accounting Office, The Accounting Profession, Major Issues:
Progress and Concerns (Sept. 1996), available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/sudocdaces/acesl60.shtml.
222

The U.S. Supreme Court for federal issues, state supreme courts for state issues.
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See, x

224

m text accompanying note 196.

Adapting existing documents to the Web seems preferable to any attempt to develop a

separate body of Web law. For example, the fbdamental elements of a contract remain
the same regardless of whether it is executed face-to-face, through the mail, or online. It

Within this general framework, non-governmental entities need to realize that, if
they do not effectively address issues that matter to users, there will be increased pressure
for governmental agencies to intervene and apply formal law. To the degree that nongovernmental entities fail to counter offensive or abusive online behavior, there will be
motivation for the government to intrude. Hence, a warning: to the extent that the Web
community does not wish to be constrained by formal law, it must self-regulate.

E. A Role for Hybrids
A common thread running through many of the above examples is the idea that
Web law might benefit from the integrated application of different types of law.
International law can condemn child pornography; federal law can criminalize actual
child pornography; and the states can experiment with approkhes to virtual child
pornography. A general Internet consumers' bill of rights can be established at the
international or federal level, and the states can fill in the details.
A promising area for the application of such hybridized, integrated law lies in tort

negligence for ISPs. On the one hand, there are strong reasons to have nationally uniform
law, including consistency of expectations among users and a consistent understanding of
duty among providers. Legislatures and courts, however, are not well suited to evaluating
the technical details of a particular Web site's security configuration.

therefore seems that the bulk of the extension of existing secondary sources to address the
Web can be handled through revised commentary, rather than through revisions to the
underlying rules.

A hybridized approach could begin with a federal statute that federalized the

general issue of tort negligence for ISPs and preempted states h m addressing the issue.
Details, such as the definition of a reasonable standard of care, would be incorporated, by
AS the SMEs revised their
reference, from work products of SMEs such as the w~c.'~'
standards to reflect techonological change, so would the federal law evolve, without the

need for additional action by Congress. The mechanisms for applying the combination of
federal statute and SME standards could be left to federal common law. Consistency
would come &om the federalization of the issue, flexibility would come from the
delegation of details to the SMEs, and practicality would come h m the courts deciding
the controversies that arose on a fact-specific basis.
The mixture of different levels of detail from different sources of law adds to the
overall flexibility of the U.S. federalist system. By increasing the flexibility, the
possibility of mixing law from different sources can only add to the potential
effectiveness of the application of law to the Web.

VIII. Summary
The U.S. federalist scheme is flexible enough to accommodate law from multiple
sources, including international, state and federal, and non-governmental sources. The

"'Subject to Learned Hand's warning that, if the industry's standards should lag too far
behind reasonable expectations, it is the role of the courts to impose higher standards.
The T.J.Hoover, 60 F.2d 737,740 (2d Cir. 1932) ("Courts must in the end say what is
required . . ..").

boundaries between these sources are fluid. Yesterday's customary practice can become
today's state common law, which can in turn become tomorrow's federal statutory law.
The Web itself is young, and the legal issues it raises are diverse. Although
certain issues fit relatively neatly under existing

other issues can find nothing

more direct than a rough analogy.227The diversity and newness of issues, when combined
with the fluidity and flexibility of the U.S. federalist system, compels the conclusion that
the federalist system has the potential to be particularly well suited to the application of
law to the Web. Along with the potential, the mix creates the challenge to best use the
toolbox of the federalist system to develop good, effective law for the Web. When the

226

With "relatively" being a key word. For example, copyright is easy when one person

copies another person's work and posts it on hislher Web site. WebbWorld, =a

note 54.

It becomes more complicated, though, when the copying user incorporates the creating
user's content via a hyperlink. Kelly v. Aniba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934,938 (9th Cir.
2002). The potential for such complexity is increased by the Web's trend toward more

fine-tuned identification of online material. See, m,RFC 2396: Uniform Resource
Identifiers (URI): Generic Svntax, $ 1.2 UTU, URL,and URN (IETF RFC, 1998),
available at http://www.ietEorg/rfc/rfc2396.txt.
227

Such as the analogy to medicine for malpractice for Web site operators. k

following note 124.

a text

potential benefits of a well implemented Web are added to the mix, the challenge
becomes a near-moral imperative.228

'"Cf. Luke 12:48 ("Forunto whomsoever much is given, of him shall much be
required.").

